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Abstract: 
Reputation systems that rely on feedback from traders are important institutions for 
helping sustain trust in markets, while feedback information is usually considered a 
public good. We apply both theoretical models and experiments to study how raters' 
feedback behavior responds to different reporting costs and how to improve market 
efficiency by introducing a pre-commitment device for sellers in reputation systems. In 
particular, the pre-commitment device we study here allows sellers to provide rebates to 
cover buyers' reporting costs before buyers make purchasing decisions. Using a buyer-
seller trust game with a unilateral feedback scheme, we find that a buyer’s propensity to 
leave feedback is more sensitive to reporting costs when the seller cooperates than when 
the seller defects. The seller’s decision on whether to provide a rebate significantly 
affects the buyer’s decision to leave feedback by compensating for the feedback costs. 
More importantly, the rebate decision has a significant impact on the buyer's purchasing 
decision via signaling the seller's cooperative type. The experimental results show that 
the rebate mechanism improves the market efficiency.  
 
JEL: C91, D82, L86, H41.  
Keywords: reputation, trust, feedback mechanism, asymmetric information, public good, 
experimental economics. 
 
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Daniel Houser, Luis Cabral, seminar participants at 
George Mason University, Rutgers University, Carnegie Mellon University, Peking University, 
Fudan University, China Central University of Finance and Economics, Zhejiang University, 
Shanghai University of  Finance and Economics, Baidu Inc., Alibaba Research Institute, and ESA 
International conference 2009 for valuable comments on the earlier drafts. We are grateful for 
grants to the first author from the University of Louisville Research Inventive program and the 
211 Project for Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (the 3rd phase), and to the second 
author from the National Science Foundation (SES-0961341) that supported this research. 
2 
 
I.  Introduction 
Reputation systems play an important role in sustaining trust in exchange environments 
where information is asymmetric.  In many situations, such as online trading, building a 
reputation system often relies on voluntary feedback from involved parties. Such 
reputation systems, however, may not be reliable due to the cost of reporting. Previous 
literature has suggested various mechanisms for improving the reliability of reputation 
systems. Most of those suggestions, however, either require reporters to bear the 
reporting cost or require the market to provide incentives. In this paper, we propose and 
examine a rebate mechanism that gives sellers the option to cover the reporting cost for 
buyers in a listing price market. We show, both theoretically and experimentally, that this 
mechanism improves the reputation system and market efficiency without requiring 
buyers or markets to bear the reporting cost.  
Previous research has pointed out that reputation systems can enhance cooperation 
when information is asymmetric
1
. With the easy accessibility of the Internet, online 
feedback systems play an important role in building reputation and trust to facilitate the 
interaction between principles and agents. For example, online markets like eBay and 
Amazon provide feedback systems that allow traders to obtain reputation information for 
their counterparts or the products on sale.  Data, however, suggests that only about 50% 
of buyers leave feedback after transactions on eBay. Furthermore, the existing feedback 
is biased toward positive due to missing negative feedback (see, Resnick and Zeckhauser, 
2002, Cabral and Hortacsu, 2010 , and Dellarocas and Wood,2008).  
                                                 
1 See, Bajari and Hortacsu, 2004; Bolton and Ockenfels, forthcoming; Bolton et al., 2005; Brandts  and 
Figueras, 2003; Brown and Morgan,2006; Dellarocas,2003a; Diamond,1989; Fehr et al., 2009; Friedman 
and Resnick,2001; Grosskopf and Sarin, forthcoming; Houser and Wooders, 2006; Jin and Kato, 2006; 
Klein, 1997; Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom et al. 1990; Shapiro, 1983; and Resnick et al. 2006.  
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There are two possible explanations for the biased feedback system.  First, there is 
a direct cost associated with reporting feedback. Participants must take time and effort to 
leave feedback. Once feedback is provided, it often becomes public information that 
everyone can access. It may not directly benefit those who leave feedback. Thus, the 
feedback system endures the public goods type of social dilemma problem (see, Bolton et 
al. 2004 and Avery et al. 1999). Second, the missing feedback may also be attributed to 
the indirect cost of reporting caused by the design of the feedback system itself (see, 
Klein et al. 2005, Dellarocas and Wood, 2008, Bolton et al., 2009 and Li, forthcoming).  
For example, if both a buyer and a seller can leave feedback for each other after a 
transaction, the buyer may hesitate to leave negative feedback. The reason is that a 
strategic seller who receives negative feedback may retaliate against the buyer by leaving 
negative feedback. This possibility of retaliation could lead to an inefficient feedback 
system (e.g., Masclet and Pénard, 2008; Bolton et al., 2009). Some online markets, such 
as eBay, have realized the ―fear of retaliation‖ problem.  eBay even implemented a policy 
to ban sellers from leaving negative feedback for buyers in May 2008. Nevertheless, this 
type of mandatory policy has made some sellers switch to other sites and has discouraged 
sellers from leaving any feedback to buyers 
2
. 
Several papers have suggested various mechanisms to induce buyers to leave 
feedback and thus induce sellers to cooperate. For example, Ba et al.(2002) suggests a 
Trusted Third Party (TTP) mechanism to issue certificates to sellers and buyers. 
Dellarocas (2003b) proposes charging a listing fee contingent on a seller's announced 
expected quality and rewarding the seller based on both the announced quality and the 
                                                 
2 See http : //money:cnn:com/2008/05/14/smbusiness/ebayf eedback:fsb/index:htm (accessed on 
September 28, 2008.） 
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rating posted for that seller by the winning bidder for that listing. Both papers suggest 
monitoring systems to induce sellers to cooperate. Miller et al.(2005)and Jurca and 
Faltings (2007) propose well-designed truth-eliciting incentive schemes to induce buyers 
to report honestly. Nevertheless, all these mechanisms either require buyers to bear the 
reporting cost or require the market (e.g., eBay) to provide incentives. If the reporting 
cost remains on the buyer’s side, buyers will still lack incentives to leave feedback. If the 
market provides such incentives, it may burden itself with a huge volume of transactions.  
In this paper, we study a rebate mechanism that facilitates exchanges and 
improves market efficiency without requiring buyers or the market to bear the cost. 
Under this rebate mechanism, sellers have the option to cover the reporting cost for 
buyers, regardless of whether the feedback is positive or negative. The essence of the 
rebate mechanism is that it plays a dual role of incentivizing buyers to leave feedback and 
providing an option for sellers to signal quality or effort to cooperate.  Thus, it not only 
improves the reputation system, but also—and perhaps even more importantly—induces 
sellers to cooperate through the additional signaling mechanism.  
We examine this rebate mechanism both theoretically and experimentally in a 
listing price market with a unilateral feedback system where the price of the product is 
predetermined and fixed and only buyers can leave feedback to sellers.
3
 We first show 
that in theory, under this rebate mechanism, there is a pooling equilibrium where both 
good and bad sellers choose the rebate option, even though their true types are revealed 
through feedback. This mechanism can induce bad sellers to cooperate and promote 
                                                 
3 As a first step toward examining the effectiveness of the rebate mechanism, we choose a listing price 
market and a unilateral feedback system. This simple setting provides us clean evidence to draw inferences 
regarding the signaling value of the rebate mechanism.  See Li (2010) for the theoretical work on how the 
rebate mechanism works in auction markets. 
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efficient trades. To test the hypothesis derived from the theory and provide empirical 
evidence for the effectiveness of the rebate mechanism, we conduct experiments based on 
a buyer-seller trust game (see, Bolton et al., 2004).  In the game, a buyer first decides 
whether to buy a product from a seller.  If the buyer decides to buy the product, the seller 
then decides whether to ship it. Our experiment consists of four treatments. In the 
baseline treatment, the computer automatically and truthfully records the feedback for 
each seller. This treatment can be taken as a perfect reputation system (see, Bolton and 
Ockenfels, forthcoming). In the other two treatments, the feedback is reported by buyers 
at their own expense. These two treatments vary only in the magnitude of the reporting 
cost. The fourth treatment is based on the high reporting cost treatment where we 
introduce the rebate mechanism.  
We investigate: 1) how reporting costs and rebate affect reporting behavior, and 
in particular, whether the reporting cost affects reporting of positive feedback in the same 
way as reporting of negative feedback? 
4
; 2) how reporting costs and rebate affect trading 
behavior; 3) whether buyers take the rebate offer as a signal of a seller’s quality; and 4) 
whether the rebate mechanism improves market efficiency. 
We find that buyers are less likely to report when the reporting cost is higher. 
Interestingly, our data suggest that both the reporting cost and the seller’s rebate decision 
have a significant effect on the buyer’s propensity to leave feedback when the seller 
cooperates, but not when the seller defects.  More importantly, the rebate decision has a 
significant impact on buyers’ purchasing decisions via signaling the seller's cooperative 
                                                 
4 Experimental economics literature shows that there exists an asymmetry in positive/negative reciprocity, 
e.g., Offerman, 2002; Keysar et al, 2008. Al-Ubaydli and Lee, 2009. 
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type. Consistent with the signal, sellers are significantly more likely to ship when they 
offer the rebate than when they do not. Our data show that under the rebate mechanism, 
market efficiency increases with the frequency of rebates received by the buyers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the 
theory framework of the rebate mechanism in the costly reputation system. Section III 
discusses the experiment design. Theory prediction is presented in Section IV. Section V 
reports the empirical results. Section VI concludes.  
 
II.  The Mechanism 
In this paper, we study the rebate mechanism in a listing price market environment. 
Consider a market with M sellers and N buyers where sellers list the same good (g) in 
each period. For each period, a buyer is randomly matched with a seller and decides 
whether to buy the product. Suppose M and N are large numbers, so a buyer will not meet 
the same seller again.
5
 If the buyer decides to buy, then the seller decides whether to ship 
the product. Suppose a buyer values the product Vb , a seller's cost of the product is Vs , 
and the market price of the product is set at P where  Vs  < P < Vb . The utilities for buyer 
and seller are as follows: 𝑈𝑏  (buyer doesn't buy) = 0; 𝑈𝑠 (buyer doesn't buy) = 0; 
 𝑈𝑏  (buyer buys, seller ships) =  𝑉𝑏 - P; 𝑈𝑠 (buyer buys, seller ships) = P-Vs; 𝑈𝑏  (buyer 
buys, seller doesn't ship) = -P; 𝑈𝑠 (buyer buys, seller doesn't ship) = P. 
 
                                                 
5 Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) report that 89% of all buyer-seller pairs conducted just one transaction 
during the five-month  period covered by the data set. 
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II. A. Adverse Selection Model 
To understand the intuitions behind the rebate mechanism, we start from a simple set up 
of a pure adverse selection model with infinite periods.  We then consider a more 
complicated model with both adverse selection and moral hazard with finite periods.  
Suppose that in a pure adverse selection model with infinite periods, where sellers behave 
according to their types, there exist two types of sellers: 1) a good type  𝜃𝐺  who has a 
high probability 𝛼 of shipping the product; and 2) a bad type  𝜃𝐵, who has a low 
probability 𝛽 of doing so (where 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1).  Suppose also that sellers behave 
according to their types. For simplicity, we assume the Vs = 0 for both types of sellers, 
and  𝑉𝑏= 1 for buyers. Assume that both buyers and sellers are risk neutral, and 𝛽 < 𝑃 <
 𝛼. In other words, if buyers can identify sellers’ types, they will buy from good sellers, 
but not from bad sellers.  Buyer i has the initial belief that the proportion of good sellers 
in the market is 𝜇0
𝑖 , and the proportion of bad sellers is1-𝜇0
𝑖 . When there is no information 
about the seller's past history, buyer i's expected payoff is  
EUb0
i = 𝜇0
𝑖   𝛼 1 − 𝑃 +   1 − 𝛼  −𝑃  +   1 − 𝜇0
𝑖    𝛽 1 − 𝑃 +  1 − 𝛽  −𝑃   
         = 𝜇0
𝑖  𝛼 +  1 − 𝜇0
𝑖   𝛽 − 𝑃.  
If buyer i's willingness to pay,  𝜇0
𝑖  𝛼 +  1 − 𝜇0
𝑖   𝛽, is higher than the listing 
price P, then buyer i will buy even when there is no reputation information. Let 𝑓 𝜇𝑖  be 
the probability that buyer i’s belief 𝜇𝑖  is greater than 
𝑃−𝛽
  𝛼−𝛽     
 where 𝑓 ∙  is an increasing 
function with 𝑓 1  = 1 and 𝑓 0  = 0 .  For a seller, the probability of a successful sale 
when paired with buyer i is Pr (sale) =Pr(buy) = Pr(𝜇𝑖 ≥  
𝑃−𝛽
  𝛼−𝛽     
)= 𝑓 𝜇𝑖 .  Since buyers 
and sellers are randomly matched in the market, a seller’s expected payoff is  
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𝐸𝑈𝑠,0  = 𝐸 𝑓  𝜇0
𝑖  ∙ 𝑃 = 𝑃 ∙ 𝐸  𝑓  𝜇0
𝑖    when there is no reputation information.  To 
simplify notations, we denote 𝐸  𝑓  𝜇0
𝑖     as 𝑓 𝜇0  so 𝐸𝑈𝑠,0  =  𝑓 𝜇0 𝑃. 
If a seller's complete past reputation history is available to buyers, then a buyer 
can update his belief by using the information. Buyer i's belief of meeting a good seller in 
period t is 
𝜇𝑡−1
𝑖 = 𝜇𝑡𝐺𝑅 +𝑡𝐵𝑅 =
𝜇0
𝑖 𝛼𝑡𝐺𝑅  1−𝛼 𝑡𝐵𝑅
𝜇0
𝑖 𝛼𝑡𝐺𝑅  1−𝛼 𝑡𝐵𝑅 + 1−𝜇0
𝑖  𝛽 𝑡𝐺𝑅  1−𝛽 𝑡𝐵𝑅
, 
where 𝑡𝐺𝑅  and 𝑡𝐵𝑅  represent the number of good and bad reports the seller received in the 
past, respectively. A seller’s expected payoff at period t is 𝐸𝑈𝑠𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟  𝜇𝑡
𝑖 ≥
𝑃−𝛽
𝛼−𝛽
 ∙ 𝑃 =
𝑓 𝜇𝑡 ∙ 𝑃.  
In the initial round, a buyer whose initial belief  𝜇0
𝑖  is less than 
𝑃−𝛽
𝛼−𝛽
 dose not buy.  
In the second round, after the buyer observes sellers’ reputations, the buyer updates 
his/her belief and decides whether to buy based on the value of 𝜇𝑡
𝑖𝛼 +  1 − 𝜇𝑡
𝑖  𝛽 and P.  
If a seller earns a good (or bad) reputation in period 1, then in period 2 there will be more 
(or less) buyers whose updated belief is that 𝜇𝑡
𝑖  is greater than   
𝑃−𝛽
𝛼−𝛽
.  Since good sellers 
have a higher probability of shipping than bad sellers, in the long run, as t goes to infinity, 
𝜇𝑡 = 1 with high probability for a good seller and 𝜇𝑡 = 0 with high probability for a bad 
seller
6
. Therefore, in the long run, when a seller’s complete reputation is revealed, a good 
seller has a higher probability of selling than a bad seller.   
When there is no information available, only optimistic buyers whose prior belief 
was  𝜇0
𝑖 <
𝑃−𝛽
𝛼−𝛽
  will buy. If the true proportion of good sellers in the market is less than  
                                                 
6 Proof is provided in the Appendix A.  
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𝑃−𝛽
𝛼−𝛽
 , then optimist buyers will be better off not buying. If the true proportion of good 
sellers in the market is greater than  
𝑃−𝛽
𝛼−𝛽
, then pessimistic buyers whose prior belief was 
𝜇0
𝑖 ≥
𝑃−𝛽
𝛼−𝛽
 will be better off buying.  When there is complete information, buyers’ 
purchasing decisions will depend on their updated beliefs about 𝜇𝑡−1. If  𝜇𝑡−1 goes up (or 
down) so that the value of 𝜇𝑡−1𝛼 +  1 − 𝜇𝑡−1 𝛽  is more (or less) than P, then the buyer 
will buy (or not buy). Compared with the no-information case, the total buyers’ welfare 
increases when there is complete information. When changing from the no-information 
case to the complete information case, there is a wealth transfer from bad sellers to good 
sellers due to the fact that buyers can identify sellers’ types in the complete information 
case.  
If there is a positive reporting cost for all buyers, say C, then future buyers may not 
update their beliefs correctly. To see this, suppose that buyers’ internal reporting benefit 
is 𝑏 ∈  0,𝐵 .7 If the reporting cost C is higher than the maximum reporting benefit B for 
all buyers, then no buyer reports.  
If C< B, we consider two cases.  In the first case, if the reporting benefits from 
giving good reports and bad reports are not symmetric, then good reports and bad reports 
will not be systematically revealed. If, for example, 60% of all good reports are revealed, 
but only 10% of all bad reports are revealed, then the observed feedback is biased 
towards positive. When the observed good and bad reports do not correctly represent the 
correct distribution of positive and negative transactions in the market, future buyers 
                                                 
7 To report feedback can be a way buyers reciprocate sellers, especially when the sellers defect. Previous 
research suggests that people are often willing to incur costs to punish norm violations or reward good 
deeds (e.g., Andreoni et al., 2003; de Quervain et al. 2004; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Xiao and Houser, 
2005). 
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cannot update their beliefs correctly. Therefore, buyers’ propensities to buy depend only 
on the initial prior belief 𝜇0
𝑖  and price P. In essence, it is the same as the case where no 
information is available.  
In the second case, if the reporting benefits from giving good reports and bad 
reports are symmetric, then good reports and bad reports will be systematically revealed.  
Future buyers can update their beliefs correctly, but at a slower rate than in the case 
where all buyers report.
8
  It takes longer for buyers to learn a seller’s type in this case 
than in the complete information case.  
The problem of missing feedback reports caused by reporting costs can be 
overcome by the following simple mechanism.  The market maker provides sellers an 
option to provide rebates (not necessarily in monetary form) contingent on buyers’ 
leaving feedback, regardless of whether the feedback is positive or negative. 
 
Proposition 1. If the rebate 𝑟 ≤  𝛼 −   𝑓(𝜇0)𝑃 and  𝑟 <   𝑓 𝜇0 𝑃 −  𝛽, there exists an 
equilibrium where good sellers always provide rebates and bad sellers mimic good 
sellers by providing rebates until their bad types are identified through the reports and 
are no longer profitable to mimic good sellers, given the off-equilibrium path belief that 
                                                 
8 It is easy to illustrate this with examples.  Consider a case where it is commonly know that α=0.8, β=0.3. 
Suppose a good seller shipped products 8 out of the first 10 periods and the 11th buyer’s prior belief is 
μ0=0.5. If the seller’s past reputation history is fully revealed, then the 11th buyer’s updated belief of the 
seller’s type being good is  
0.5×0.88 1−0.8 2
0.5×0.88 1−0.8 2+0.5×0.38 1−0.3 2
= 0.99. . However, if the seller’s past positive 
and negative feedback are symmetrically revealed half of the time, then the 11th buyer’s updated belief is 
only 
0.5×0.84 1−0.8 1
0.5×0.84 1−0.8 1+0.5×0.34 1−0.3 1
= 0.93.  Please note that a good seller may not necessarily ship the 
products 8 out every 10 times.  
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anyone who chooses not to rebate must be a bad seller. If the rebate r > α- f(μ0)P, then 
both types of sellers will choose not to offer rebate, NRS. 
Proof: See appendix B. 
The intuition is as follows: if good sellers choose the rebate option but bad sellers 
do not, then buyers can immediately identify sellers' types by observing who provides 
rebates. Therefore, bad sellers will mimic good sellers in the early periods. Since both 
types of sellers provide rebates to overcome buyers' reporting cost, buyers will report. We 
assume that all buyers report honestly if they decide to report. Thus, a bad seller's type 
will be revealed through feedback reports. In the long run, a bad seller will not have an 
incentive to mimic good sellers by providing the rebate. This pooling equilibrium still 
holds when we combine moral hazard with the adverse selection model.  
 
II. B. Mixed Model with both Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 
In a model with both adverse selection and moral hazard with a limited period T where 
sellers can make an effort to influence transaction outcomes, and using a set up similar to 
the pure adverse selection model discussed above, if both good and bad sellers put forth 
effort (e =1), they will ship the products with probability 1. If they do not put forth effort 
(e = 0), they will not ship product with probability 1.
9
 Assume that for good sellers, the 
cost of making an effort is 0,  𝐶𝜃𝐺  𝑒 = 1 = 𝑒 0 = 0, and  for bad sellers, the cost of 
making an effort is 𝐶𝜃𝐵  𝑒 = 1 = 𝑒 1 > 0. To simplify, we assume good sellers will 
always make an effort, since it costs nothing to them. In this case, a seller needs to 
consider whether to make the effort as part of his strategy. A buyer's propensity to buy at 
period t is 𝑓 𝜇𝑡−1
𝑖 +  1 − 𝜇𝑡−1
𝑖  𝑒 𝑡 , where 𝑒 𝑡   is the buyer's expectation of a bad seller's 
                                                 
9 It is possible to assume this probability to be 𝜑  0 < 𝜑 < 1 , and the main result still holds. 
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effort. The belief that the seller is a good type in period 2 after seeing a good report in 
period 1 is: 
𝜇1 = 𝑃 𝜃𝐺 𝐺𝑅 =
𝑃 𝐺𝑅 𝜃𝐺 𝑃 𝜃𝐺 
𝑃 𝐺𝑅 𝜃𝐺 𝑃 𝜃𝐺 + 𝑃 𝐺𝑅 𝜃𝐵 𝑃 𝜃𝐵 
=
𝜇0
𝑖
𝜇0
𝑖 +  1 − 𝜇0
𝑖  𝑒 1 
. 
Up to period t, if all the past reports are good reports, then the updated prior of meeting a 
good seller is: 
𝜇𝑡−1
𝑖 =
𝜇 𝑡−2
𝑖
𝜇 𝑡−2
𝑖 + 1−𝜇𝑡−2
𝑖  𝑒𝑡−1
. 
Once a seller gets a bad report, then buyers know that he must be a bad seller, so the 
belief that the seller is a good type equals 0, and a buyer’s willingness to pay him is 0 
thereafter. In the last period, T, the buyer's willingness to pay is 𝜇𝑇, since bad sellers will 
not make an effort in the last period. 
 
Proposition 2: If 𝑒 1 ≤   1 −  1 − 𝛿 𝑓 𝜇0  𝑃, bad sellers will make a genuine effort 
for t=0 to t=T-1 but will cease to do so in the last period. 
Proof: See Appendix C.  
When the reporting cost is more than the maximum internal reporting benefit, 
buyers will not report. Thus, bad sellers will have no incentive to make an effort. In this 
case, if we introduce the rebate mechanism into the market, it will induce bad sellers to 
put forth effort if the cost of providing a rebate is lower than the future gains from having 
a good reputation.  This intuition is similar to that in the case of pure adverse selection.  
 
Proposition 3: If the rebate 𝑟 <  [1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑓(𝜇0)]𝑃 − 𝑒(1) and 
 𝑒(1) ≤  [1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑓(𝜇0)]𝑃 , then a bad seller will choose the rebate option and make 
an effort in the first T - 1 periods, but not in the last period T. 
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Proof: See Appendix D.  
Unlike a monitoring mechanism suggested in the earlier literature (e.g., Ba and 
Pavlou, 2002  and Dellarocas, 2003b), this rebate mechanism provides an option for 
sellers to  signal quality rather than requiring them to do so. As an ―inducing‖ 
mechanism, rather than an ―enforcing‖ mechanism, it allows both good sellers and bad 
sellers to co-exist in the market, but makes it possible for buyers to distinguish between 
them through feedback over time. 
We next describe the experiments we conducted to examine empirically how 
people behave under this rebate mechanism.  
 
III. Experiment  
 
III. A Experiment Design 
Our experiment consists of four treatments: 1) Computer automatic feedback treatment 
(Auto_fb); 2) Feedback cost 10 treatment (C10); 3) Feedback cost 5 treatment (C5); and 4) 
Feedback cost 10 with Rebate 5 treatment (C10r5).  Each treatment consists of 10 rounds. 
In each round, each subject is randomly paired with another subject. Each round consists 
of two stages. The first stage is exactly the same in each treatment. Treatments differ in 
the second stage.  
The first stage is a buyer-seller game (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2007) described in 
Figure A. It is exactly the same in each treatment. In this stage, subjects are paired 
anonymously, with one acting as a seller and the other acting as a buyer.  If the buyer 
decides not to buy the product, the game ends and each participant earns 
35E$ (experiment dollars).  If the buyer decides to buy the product, then the seller 
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decides whether to ship the product.  If the seller ships the product, each earns 50E$. If 
the seller does not ship the product, the seller earns 60E$ and the buyer earns 10E$. 
 The first stage is followed by a second stage where the seller receives feedback.  
The seller is informed of the feedback she receives in each round. Starting from the 
second round, each buyer sees the paired seller’s feedback from all the previous rounds.  
 
Computer automatic feedback treatments (Auto_fb).   
In this treatment, the computer automatically records the feedback for each seller. If the 
buyer did not buy the product in the first stage, then the seller has no decision to make. In 
this case, the seller receives ―N/A (no report).‖ If the buyer bought the product and the 
seller shipped the product, the computer automatically leaves a ―+(positive)‖ feedback for 
the seller. If the seller did not ship the product, the seller receives a ―-(negative)‖ 
feedback.  All these are common knowledge. Therefore, in this treatment, the reputation 
mechanism is complete and perfect in that the costless feedback truthfully and fully 
reveals the seller’s behavior in the past. This treatment informs us what happens under 
the perfect reputation system.  
 
Feedback cost 10 treatment (C10) and Feedback cost 5 treatment (C5). (see. Figure B 
and  C) 
In both treatments, after the buyer purchases the product and the seller makes the 
shipping decision, the buyer can leave feedback for the seller at the cost of 10E$ in the 
C10 treatment or 5E$ in the C5 treatment.  
As we mentioned above, if there is some psychological benefit to reporting, 
buyers might be willing to incur some monetary cost to report. Ex ante, we do not know 
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the magnitude of this non-monetary value of reporting. We speculate that a reporting cost 
of E$5 is probably not high enough  for some buyers and that their psychological benefit 
of reporting may be higher than the monetary cost of E$5. Thus, some buyers will report 
in this treatment. Our goal is to test the effectiveness of the rebate mechanism when the 
feedback system is ineffective due to the cost of reporting. We design the C10 treatment 
where the reporting cost is E$10. This is the highest reporting cost we could impose so 
that the buyer would not have a negative earning from the game (when the seller did not 
ship the product and the buyer chose to report). We assume the reporting cost of 10E$ is 
high enough that the buyer will not report in this treatment.  
If a buyer decides to pay the price to rate her seller, the buyer can leave positive, 
negative or neutral feedback. If the buyer decides not to rate the seller, the seller will 
receive ―N/A (no report)‖ as her feedback for that round. In addition, if the buyer does 
not purchase the product, the paired seller also receives a feedback of ―N/A (no report)‖ 
in that round. That is, if the seller has a feedback of ―N/A (no report),‖ this means that 
either the buyer did not purchase the product from the seller or the buyer purchased but 
did not report feedback.  The reason we design the feedback mechanism this way is to 
closely mimic real online markets where there is no feedback, both when there is no trade 
and when the buyer is not willing to leave feedback. 
 
Feedback cost 10 with rebate 5 treatment (C10r5) (see Figure D) 
To examine the rebate mechanism, we introduce a rebate mechanism in the C10 
treatment where we assume the high cost of reporting leads to an ineffective reputation 
mechanism.  The design of the C10r 5 treatment is the same as the C10 treatment except 
that at the beginning of each round, before the buyer decides whether to purchase the 
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product, the seller first decides whether to provide a rebate of 5E$ to cover half of the 
reporting cost the buyer will incur if she leaves feedback for the seller. If the seller 
provides the rebate and the buyer pays 10E$ to report the feedback in the second stage, 
there is a 5E$ transfer from the seller to the buyer at the end of the round. On the other 
hand, as long as the buyer does not leave feedback, the 5E$ rebate transfer does not 
happen even if the seller provides the rebate. Each buyer can see whether her seller 
provides the rebate when deciding whether to purchase the product.  
 We design the rebate value equal to 5E$ so that our treatments allow us to 
examine the signaling role of rebate. In the C10r5 treatment, if the seller provides a 
rebate of 5E$, the buyer’s payoff scenario is equivalent to that of the C5 treatment. 
Similarly, if the seller does not provide a rebate of 10E$, the buyer’s payoff scenario is 
equivalent to that of the C10 treatment. Thus, by comparing buyers’ decisions in the C5 
(or C10) treatment and in their payoff equivalent scenario in the C10r5 treatment, we can 
draw inferences on the non-monetary value of sellers’ rebate choices to buyers10.  
Note that the feedback each seller receives is either positive, negative, neutral or 
N/A.  Since sellers in each treatment have two decisions to make—rebate and ship—then 
in principle, buyers can leave feedback based on their satisfaction regarding not only the 
seller’s shipping decision but also the rebate decision. For example, buyers might leave 
negative feedback when the seller did not provide the rebate even if the seller shipped the 
product.  As we report below, in this treatment we do not observe any incidence of 
                                                 
10 Note that if we design a rebate value equal to 10E$, when the seller provides a rebate, the buyer’s net 
reporting cost will be zero. To provide a cost equivalent treatment for this condition, we will need another 
treatment where buyers can decide whether to leave feedback at no monetary cost (which differs from 
Auto_fb treatment).  
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feedback decisions that are inconsistent with the seller’s shipping decision (i.e., positive 
feedback for ―not ship‖ and negative feedback for ―ship‖)11.  
 
III. B Procedure 
The experiment was conducted at P.E.E.L lab using z-tree (see, Fischbacher, 2007).  
Subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned a role and the role was fixed in all 
ten rounds. Each subject was randomly and anonymously paired with another subject 
each round.  One round was randomly chosen as the payoff round. Each subject was paid 
according to the outcome in that round. Subjects were paid privately.  
 
IV. Theory predictions 
In this section, we derive theory predictions of sellers’ and buyers’ decisions based on 
our theory framework discussed in Section II. Both the pure adverse selection model and 
the mixed model may be applied to our environment.
12
  If the theoretical predictions for 
both models are different, we list them separately. 
 
Buyer's reporting decisions 
Hypothesis 1: Reporting cost has a negative effect on buyers’ reporting behavior.  
                                                 
11 In all three treatments where buyers can leave feedback, we only observe one incidence of inconsistent 
feedback.  In the C5 treatment where no rebate option is available at all, one buyer in the second round left 
a negative feedback to a seller who shipped the product.  The feedback behavior of this buyer in the 
following rounds, however, is consistent with the shipping decisions of her paired seller. So it might be just 
a mistake made by this buyer in the early rounds of the session.  
12 Our data from the survey also suggest that this is the case. For example, one of the participating sellers 
wrote on the post-experiment survey that she had made up her mind to cheat in the 4th and 8th round before 
she played the game, so her behavior is consistent with the pure adverse selection model.  
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Prob (report): 0     C10  < C5  <1 
This hypothesis is derived from the assumption that buyers are risk neutral and 
utility maximizers, and the reporting cost of 10E$ is so high that the buyer will not report 
in this treatment.  
 
Buyers’ purchasing decisions 
Hypothesis 2: Buyers are less likely to buy when reporting is costly. 
-  pure adverse selection 
           Prob(buy):   C10 ,C5 < Auto_fb  
      -  mixed model 
           Prob(buy): C10 <C5    Auto_fb 
In the pure adverse selection model, sellers act according to their types. In the Auto_fb 
treatment, information is complete, so buyers can correctly update their prior beliefs to 
decide whether to buy. If a seller’s past history contains a lot of good reports so that it 
makes both optimistic and pessimistic buyers updated beliefs 𝜇𝑡
𝑖 ≥
𝑃−𝛽
𝛼−𝛽
, then both types 
of buyers will buy.  In the C10 treatment, as we discussed above, we assume that no one 
will report. Buyers cannot correctly update their beliefs, so only optimistic buyers whose 
initial belief is 𝜇0
𝑖 ≥
𝑃−𝛽
𝛼−𝛽
 will buy. In the C5 treatment, some buyers may report if the 
information about positive and negative is systematically revealed. Then buyers can 
update their beliefs correctly and both optimistic and pessimistic buyers will buy from 
good sellers, but at a slower rate than in the Auto_fb treatment. In this case, the 
probability of buying in C10 is lower than in C5 and Auto_fb.  If the information is not 
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systematically revealed, then buyers cannot correctly update their beliefs, so only 
optimistic buyers will buy.  In this case, the probability of buying in C10 is the same as in 
C5 and lower than in Auto_fb.  
In the mixed model, a good seller always makes an effort, so s/he will always get 
positive feedback, if any. A bad seller may choose to make an effort. If he/she does not 
make an effort in some rounds and the buyers in those rounds report, then he/she will 
definitely receive some negative feedback.  As a consequence, no buyer will buy from 
her in the future, since good sellers always make an effort to provide good transactions 
and only bad sellers strategically choose whether to make an effort. Thus, as long as at 
least one buyer reports negative feedback, a bad seller who cares about future payoff will   
choose to make an effort. In the C10 treatment, we assume that the reporting cost is so 
high that no one reports in this treatment. Consequently, bad sellers will not make an 
effort, and only optimistic buyers will buy. In the C5 treatment, as we mentioned above, 
we assume that for some buyers, the benefit of reporting is higher than the reporting cost 
of $E5, and as a result, they will report.  Bad sellers know that if they fail to make an 
effort and at least some buyers in some rounds report, they will receive negative feedback.  
Consequently, they will make an effort in order to have future payoffs.  Assuming both 
good and bad sellers will make an effort and ship the products, buyers in the C5 treatment 
will be more likely to buy the products than those in the C10 treatment. In the Auto_fb 
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case, all reports are revealed, so bad sellers will make an effort, and buyers will be more 
likely to buy than in the C10 case
13
.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Buyers take ―no rebate‖ as a signal of a bad seller. 
      Prob
C10
(buy) > Prob
C10r5
(buy | No Rebate) 
      Prob
C10r5 
(buy | Rebate) > Prob
C10r5 
(buy | No Rebate)   
In both theoretical models, there exists a pooling equilibrium that both types of sellers 
will choose to give rebates as long as it is profitable for bad sellers to mimic good ones. 
Therefore, ―providing rebate‖ does not provide any information about the type of seller, 
but ―not providing rebate‖ does. The reporting cost in the C10 treatment is the same as in 
the C10r5 treatment when the seller does not offer a rebate, but the latter case provides 
additional information about the seller’s quality.  Thus, ceteris paribus, buyers should be 
less likely to buy the product in the latter case than in the former.  
 Comparing the case in the C10r5 treatment where the seller offers a rebate with 
the case where the seller does not offer a rebate, buyers expect the seller to be more likely 
to cooperate in the former than in the latter case. Additionally, the reporting cost for the 
buyer is lower in the former case than in the latter case. Thus, we predict that in the 
C10r5 treatment, buyers will be more likely to buy when the seller offers a rebate than 
when the seller does not. 
                                                 
13 If our assumption that no one reports in C10 is invalid (i.e., some buyers still report or sellers believe that 
some buyers will report), in the pure adverse selection model, the result in C10 treatment is indifferent from 
that in the C5 treatment. In the mixed model case, bad sellers will make an effort to ship the products like 
in the C5 and Auto_fb treatments. As a result, the probability of buying in the  C10 treatment is indifferent 
from C5 and Auto_fb treatments.  
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Seller's rebate and shipping decisions 
Hypothesis 4: Sellers are less likely to ship when reporting is costly. 
    -   pure adverse selection model :  
         Prob(ship):  C10 = C5 = Auto_fb  
    -   mixed model:  
         Prob(ship):  C10 <C5   Auto_fb  
In the pure adverse selection model, since sellers act according to their types, the 
probability of shipping should not change in different reporting cost treatments.  
In the mixed model, the analysis of sellers’ shipping decisions is similar to the 
analysis in Hypothesis 3. The reason is that buyers’ buying decisions depend on how they 
think sellers will behave. In the C10 treatment, we assume that no one will report. Thus, 
bad sellers will not put forth an effort, and only optimistic buyers will buy. In the C5 and 
Auto_fb treatments, at least some buyers will report, so bad sellers will make an effort in 
order to have future payoffs. As a result, the probability of shipping is higher than in the 
C10 treatment
14
.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Seller’s decision not to offer a rebate signals his/her intention to defect. 
         Prob
C10r5 
(ship| Rebate) > Prob
C10r5 
(ship | No Rebate)  
                                                 
14 If our assumption that no one reports in the C10 treatment is invalid ( i.e., some buyers still report or 
sellers believe that some buyers will report),  then bad sellers will make an effort to ship the  products like 
in the C5 and Auto_fb treatments. As a result, the probability of shipping in the C10 treatment is indifferent 
from the C5 and Auto_fb treatments. 
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Our theoretical framework discussed above suggests that bad sellers will mimic good 
sellers by choosing the rebate option until it is no longer profitable for them to continue 
providing rebates. Although the decision to provide rebates does not help us identify 
good sellers and bad sellers, a decision not to provide a rebate signals the seller’s 
intention to defect. Therefore, we predict that in the C10r5 treatment, sellers who do not 
provide a rebate will be less likely to ship the product than those who offer a rebate.  
 
Market efficiency 
Hypothesis 6: Market efficiency can be improved by the rebate mechanism: a buyer who 
receives rebates more often can also achieve more efficient trades.  
We define efficient trades as cases where the buyer buys and the seller ships. As 
discussed in Hypothesis 3, buyers are more likely to buy when offered a rebate. 
Meanwhile, Hypothesis 5 suggests that the shipping rate is higher when sellers offer a 
rebate than when sellers do not.  Combining these two hypotheses, we predict that the 
more often a buyer receives rebates, the more efficient trades the buyer can achieve. 
 
V. Results 
We obtained observations on 214 subjects: 24 pairs in Auto_fb; 23 pairs in C5; 24 pairs 
in C10; and 36 pairs in C10r5.  We first report results of buyers’ decisions, followed by 
results of sellers’ decisions. Lastly, we examine how the rebate mechanism affects market 
efficiency. 
 
V. A. Buyer’s feedback reporting decisions  
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Our data suggest that buyers report feedback honestly most of the time in the C5, C10 
and C10r5 treatments. One buyer in the C5 treatment paid 5E$ to leave feedback of 
―negative‖ in one round, and one buyer in the C10 treatment paid 10E$ to leave feedback 
of ―neutral‖ in one round after the seller shipped the product. Also, one buyer in the 
C10r5 treatment left feedback of ―neutral‖ after her seller provided a rebate and shipped 
the product.  In all the other cases where the buyer chose to leave feedback, he/she left 
positive feedback for cooperative sellers and negative feedback for non-cooperative 
sellers. Thus, in the following analysis, we focus only on the frequency of reporting and 
not the honesty of reporting.   
We first compare buyers’ feedback reporting behavior in the C5 and C10 
treatments to test Hypothesis 1. We then compare buyers’ reporting behavior in the 
C10r5 treatment with C5 and C10 to explore the effect of rebate on feedback reporting 
behavior. Our main findings in this regard are that both reporting cost and rebates have a 
significant effect on the buyer’s propensity to leave feedback when the seller shipped the 
product but not when the seller failed to ship the product.  
 
Result 1. The cost of feedback has a significant negative effect on the buyer’s reporting 
decision.  
We calculate the feedback reporting rate among those buyers who purchased the 
product (see Table 1) in each treatment. Supporting our Hypothesis 1, the cost of 
feedback has a significant negative effect on the buyer’s reporting decision. About 32% 
of buyers left feedback for the seller when the cost of doing so was 5E$.  In contrast, 
when the reporting cost was 10E$, only about 10% of buyers left feedback.  Using the 
data from Treatment C10 and Treatment C5, we ran a random effect Logit regression 
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analysis of the probability of buyers who bought the product to leave feedback (see Table 
2 column (1)). The independent variables include round, dummy for the final round, and 
two treatment dummies. The coefficients of the two treatment dummies are significantly 
different (chi-square test, p=0.01)
15
.  
Previous research has shown that people are more willing to punish bad behavior 
than to reward good behavior (see Al-Ubaydli and Lee, 2009). If reporting feedback is a 
way for the buyer to reciprocate to the seller, we should expect that buyers might be more 
willing to leave negative feedback when the seller did not ship the product than to leave 
positive feedback when the seller shipped the product.  In view of this, we next 
investigate how buyers left feedback in the C5 and C10 treatments and compare how cost 
affects a buyer’s propensity to leave feedback when the seller ships versus when the 
seller does not ship the product. 
 
Result 2. Buyers are more likely to leave feedback when the seller does not ship the 
product than when the seller ships the product. The propensity of buyers to leave 
feedback is more sensitive to the reporting cost when the seller is cooperative than when 
the seller defects.   
We find that in both the C5 and C10 treatments, buyers were more likely to leave 
feedback when the seller did not ship the product than when the seller shipped the 
product (50% vs.28 % in the C5 treatment and 40% vs. 4% in the C10 treatment, 
respectively). Thus, reporting behavior is negative biased.   
To provide statistical evidence, we ran a random effect Logit regression analysis 
of feedback reporting behavior (see Table 2column (2)) similar to the regression analysis 
                                                 
15 All the coefficient comparison tests reported henceforth are chi-square tests with two-tail p-values. 
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reported in Table 2 column (1). The only difference is that we separated the cases of 
cooperative sellers from the non-cooperative sellers. Thus, the independent variables 
include round, last round dummy, interactions of treatment dummies and whether the 
seller shipped the product.  We find that the coefficient of C10ship is significantly 
different than that of C10noship and the coefficient of C5ship is significantly different 
than that of C5noship (p<0.01). 
Moreover, the coefficient of C10noship is not significantly different from 
C5noship (p=0.19). However, the coefficient of C10ship is significantly different from 
C5ship (p<0.01). These results suggest that the propensity of buyers to leave feedback is 
less sensitive to the reporting cost when the seller defects than when the seller cooperates.  
Thus, higher reporting costs lead to more negative-biased reporting behavior. 
Next, we consider the effect of rebate on buyers’ reporting behavior.  
 
Result 3. The rebate affects a buyer’s propensity to leave feedback when the seller 
cooperates but has no effect on the buyer’s reporting propensity when the seller defects. 
To see the effect of a rebate on buyers’ reporting decisions, we expand the 
random effect Logit regression model we discussed in Result 2 by including the data 
from the C10r5 treatment. For C10r5 treatment data, we also separate the cases where the 
seller cooperated from the cases where the seller defected and the cases where the seller 
provided a rebate from the cases where the seller did not provide a rebate. The result of 
the regression is reported in Table 2 column (3). First, we find that the coefficient of 
―C10r5_rebship‖ is significantly different from ―C10r5_norebship‖ (p<0.01) and 
―C10ship‖ ( p<0.01), but not significantly different from ―C5ship‖(chi-square test, p= 
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0.96). Meanwhile, the coefficient of ―C10r5_norebship‖ is significantly different from 
―C5ship‖ (p=0.02), but not significantly different from ―C10ship‖ (p=0.56).  
On the other hand, all the coefficients of the independent variables related to the 
cases where the sellers failed to ship are not significantly different between each other. 
For example, the coefficient of ―C10r5_rebnoship‖ is not significantly different from that 
of ―C5noship‖ or ―C10noship‖ or ―C10r5_norebnoship‖ (p>0.10). The coefficient of 
―C10r5_norebnoship‖ is not significantly different from that of ―C5noship‖or 
―C10noship‖ (p>0.10).  
These results suggest that rebates, by compensating for the cost, can make buyers 
more likely to leave feedback when sellers ship the product, but have no effect on buyers’ 
reporting decisions when sellers fail to ship the product.  This suggests that if buyers’ 
reporting behavior is negative-biased as shown above, then offering a rebate can reduce 
such negative bias by increasing the reporting rate when sellers cooperate. It is also 
worthwhile to note that, as we mentioned earlier, buyers report feedback honestly most of 
the time regardless of whether a rebate is provided. In other words, our data suggest that a 
seller’s rebate decision affects the propensity to report, but not the honesty of the 
feedback. 
 
V. B. Buyer’s purchasing decisions  
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we first report the comparison of buyers’ purchasing 
behavior in the Auto_fb, C5 and C10 treatments to see how buyers’ purchasing behavior 
is affected by the feedback reporting cost. We then compare buyers’ purchasing behavior 
in the C10r5 treatment with Auto_fb, C5 and C10 to explore how it is affected by the 
rebate mechanism.  
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As shown in Table 1, on average, buyers purchase the product about 79% of the 
time in the Auto_fb treatment, 70% in the C5 treatment, and 68% in the C10 treatment.  
This result is consistent with our Hypothesis 2.  However, as we report below, these 
differences are not significant. We start our analysis with a simple random effect Logit 
regression model of buyers’ purchasing decisions, including only round, last round 
dummy, and three treatment dummies as independent variables. The result is reported in 
Table 3 column (1).  We find that the coefficients of C5, C10 and Auto_fb are not jointly 
significantly different from each other (p=0.23). Nor is any pairwise comparison of the 
coefficients of any two treatments significant (p>0.10).  
 
Result 4. Buyers’ purchasing behavior is affected by the previous feedbacks sellers 
received. 
To gain further understanding about how buyers make the purchasing decision in 
each round, we next expand our regression model by adding the current matched seller’s 
reputation variables and the shipping decision of the matched seller in the previous round.  
Previous research shows that reputation history of sellers has a different effect on buyers’ 
decisions depending on when the feedback is reported. In particular, the most recent 
feedback is more important for the buyer than earlier feedback (see, Bolton et al., 2005). 
In view of this, we separate the most recent feedback in the previous round from the other 
feedback received in the past (round 2 to round t-2).  For each buyer i in round t, we 
calculate the total amount of positive feedback and negative feedback received by the 
matched seller from round 2 to round t-2, respectively. 
Therefore, the independent variables in the regression include: round (t), final 
round dummy, C5 treatment dummy (C5), C10 treatment dummy (C10), Automatic 
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feedback treatment dummy(Auto_fb) , total number of positive feedback the matched 
seller received up to round t-2   Positive fbi,t
t−2
t=1  , total number of negative feedback 
the seller received up to round t-2   Negative fbi,t
t−2
t=1  , whether the seller received  
positive feedback in the previous round  Positive fbi,t−1 , whether the seller received  
negative feedback in the previous round  Negative fbi,t−1  and whether the seller shipped 
the product in the previous round  Shipi,t−1 .  The result is reported in Table 3 column 
(2). 
Consistent with previous literature (see the survey paper Dellarocas 2003a), the 
regression result shows that buyers are more likely to buy if the seller received  positive 
feedback in the previous round and less likely to buy if the seller just received  negative 
feedback in the previous round (the coefficient of 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑏𝑖 ,𝑡−1 is significantly 
positive and the coefficient of 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑏𝑖 ,𝑡−1 is significantly negative).  Buyers also 
take into account the total amount of negative feedback received by the seller in the past 
when deciding whether to buy. The more negative feedback the seller received two 
rounds ago, the less likely the buyer will buy the product (the coefficient of 
 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑏𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑡−2
𝑡=1  is significantly negative). Interestingly, however, the amount of 
positive feedback received two rounds ago does not have a significant effect on a buyer’s 
purchasing decisions (the coefficient of  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑏𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑡−2
𝑡=1  is positive but not 
significant). 
We next investigate the effect of the rebate mechanism on buyers’ purchasing 
decisions. 
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Result 5. Supporting Hypothesis 3, buyers are significantly less likely to buy the product 
when the seller did not provide the rebate in C10r5 treatment than when the seller 
provided the rebate or when there is no rebate opportunity at all.   
As reported in Table 1, in the C10r5 treatment, buyers purchase the product about 
84% of the time if the seller provides a rebate (the highest purchase rate among all the 
conditions), but only about 36% of the time if the seller does not provide the rebate (the 
lowest purchase rate among all the conditions). To provide statistical evidence of the 
comparison of purchase rate in each condition, we further expand our regression model 
discussed above (Table 3 Column 2 regression) by including data from all four treatments. 
In addition to all the independent variables in the Column 2 regression, we add dummies 
of whether the seller provided a rebate to the buyer in this round (C10r5_norebi,t and 
C10r5_rebi,t). The result of the regression is reported in Table 3 column (3).  
The regression result supports Hypothesis 3: ―not providing rebate‖ provides 
information about the types of sellers, but ―providing rebate‖ does not.  To see this, first 
note that buyers are more likely to buy when the seller offers the rebate than when the 
seller does not (the coefficient of C10r5_norebi,t is significant lower than that of 
C10r5_rebi,t, p<0.01). Second, when the seller does not provide the rebate, his/her buyer 
is much less likely to buy than when the seller does not have the rebate opportunity at all 
(the coefficient of C10r5_norebi,t is significantly lower than that of C10, p<0.01). On the 
other hand, providing the rebate does not make buyers more likely to buy than when the 
rebate mechanism is not available (the coefficient of C10r5_rebi,t  is not significantly 
different from that of C5, p=0.75). These results suggest that sellers’ rebate decisions 
affect buyers’ purchasing decisions not via compensating the ex post reporting cost but 
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by signaling the buyer about the quality of the seller. We next provide evidence that the 
seller’s rebate decision is indeed a credible signal of her cooperativeness.  
 
V. C. Seller’s rebate and shipping decisions 
We first test Hypothesis 4 by investigating how sellers’ shipping decisions may differ 
between treatments due to the reporting cost. Then, to test Hypothesis 5, we investigate 
how sellers make rebate decisions and how rebate decisions are correlated with shipping 
decisions.  
 We report sellers’ shipping rates in Table 1.  Consistent with Hypothesis 4, the 
shipping rate is highest among the three non-rebate treatments in the Auto_fb treatment 
(88%) and lowest in the C10 treatment (81%). The difference, however, is small.  
Similar to the analysis of buyers’ decisions, to provide statistical evidence, we 
first conduct a random effect Logit regression analysis of the sellers’ shipping decisions 
by including only round variables, C10, C5, and Auto_fb treatment dummy variables. 
This allows us to see whether the seller’s shipping decision overall is significantly 
affected by the feedback reporting cost. The regression result is reported in Table 4. We 
find that the coefficients of the three treatment dummies are not jointly significantly 
different from one another (p=0.76).  Nor is any pairwise comparison of the coefficients 
of any two treatments significant (p>0.10). Thus, although our data suggests that the 
shipping rate is decreasing in the reporting cost, this effect of reporting cost is not 
significant.  
 We next examine how sellers make rebate decisions and how the rebate decision 
is correlated with sellers’ shipping decisions. 
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Result 6. Sellers are more likely to offer the rebate if they did not offer the rebate in the 
previous round and the buyer did not buy the product than if they did not offer the rebate 
in the previous round and the buyer bought the product.  
In the C10r5 treatment, every seller provided a rebate at least once to the buyer. 
On average, sellers chose to offer a rebate 75% of the time. About 90% of sellers chose to 
offer a rebate at least half of the time. The distribution of rebate frequency is plotted in 
Figure 1.  
As we reported above, most buyers C10r5 treatment did not purchase if the seller 
did not offer the rebate.  Sellers who did not offer the rebate may learn from their 
experience that they are less likely to sell their product if they do not provide a rebate and 
thus learn to offer rebates over time.  To examine whether sellers’ rebate decisions are 
indeed affected by buyers’ decisions, we calculate sellers’ frequency of offering the 
rebate in each of four cases, depending on whether the seller provided the rebate in the 
previous round t-1 and whether his/her buyer bought the product in that round: 1) seller 
provided the rebate and buyer bough the product in round t-1; 2) seller provided the 
rebate but buyer did not buy the product in round t-1; 3) seller did not provide the rebate 
but buyer bought the product in round t-1; and 4) seller did not provide the rebate and 
buyer did not buy the product in round t-1.  We find that if the seller provided a rebate in 
the previous round, her decision on rebate in the current round is not greatly affected by 
whether the buyer bought the product or not in the previous round (90% vs. 97%). In 
contrast, if the seller did not provide a rebate in the previous round, she is much more 
likely to provide the rebate in the current round if the buyer did not purchase the product 
than if the buyer purchased the product in the previous round (51% vs. 20%).  
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To provide statistical evidence on these differences, we ran a random individual 
Logit regression analysis of sellers’ rebate decisions in round t. The independent 
variables include only the four dummies corresponding to each of the four scenarios 
mentioned above. We find that the coefficients for the first two scenarios when the seller 
provided the rebate in round t-1 (buyer bought the product in round t-1 vs. did not buy the 
product) are not significant (p=0.15), but those for the second two scenarios where the 
seller did not provide the rebate in round t-1 (buyer bought the product in round t-1 vs. 
did not buy the product) are significant (p=0.01).  
Furthermore, we see more and more sellers offering the rebate over time. Figure 2 
plots the proportion of sellers who offer the rebate from round 1 to round 10. The slope is 
significantly positive (p=0.01), suggesting that over time sellers learn that providing the 
rebate can increase their chance of making a profit. 
 
Result 7. The more often rebates a seller provides, the more likely the seller will ship the 
product. 
  To examine whether sellers’ shipping decisions are correlated with their rebate 
decisions, we calculate, for each seller, his/her frequency of offering rebates and the 
frequency of shipping the product when the buyer chooses to buy the product.  We find 
that when sellers provide a rebate no more than half of the time, their shipping rate is 
about 63%; in contrast, this rate is 82% for sellers who offer a rebate more than half of 
the time. To test whether the correlation between rebate and shipping decisions is 
significant, we ran a Tobit regression analysis of the seller i’s average shipping rates in 
the C10r5 treatment using the frequency of rebates seller i offered to the matched buyers 
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as the independent variable.  We find that the coefficient of this independent variable is 
significantly positive (p<0.01).  
  
V. D. Market efficiency 
To test Hypothesis 6 that a rebate mechanism can improve market efficiency, we first 
examine the number of efficient trades (i.e., the case where the buyer bought and the 
seller shipped the product) in each treatment. We then compare the earnings of buyers 
and sellers among each treatment.  
 
Result 8. The feedback reporting cost reduces the proportion of efficient trades. Under 
the rebate mechanism, the number of efficient trades is increasing in the frequency of 
rebate provided to the buyer.  
 Figure 3 plots the proportion of efficient trades in each treatment. In the C10r5 
treatment, we also separate the case where sellers provide the rebate from the case where 
they do not.  Figure 3 shows that the proportion of efficient trades is decreasing in the 
feedback reporting cost. The number of efficient trades is highest in the case where the 
seller offers the rebate in the C10r5 treatment and lowest when the seller fails to offer the 
rebate in the C10r5 treatment. To provide statistical analysis of efficient trades, we define 
a variable Eftrade i,t = 1 if the buyer bought and received the product, and =0 if the buyer 
did not buy or bought but the seller failed to ship the product .  We then calculate the 
average number of efficient trades over 10 rounds for each buyer: 
𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐸𝑓𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 =  𝐸𝑓𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡
10
𝑡=1 /10. 
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To examine the effect of rebate on market efficiency, for each buyer in the C10r5 
treatment, we calculated, over the 10 rounds, the average proportion of times she was 
offered a rebate before deciding whether to purchase the product: 
Avg_rebtmsi =  
 C10r5_rebi,t
10
t=1
10
,         if C10r5 treatment
0,                    if Autofb , C5 or C10 treatment
  
where C10r5_rebi,t = 1  if buyer i was offered a rebate in round t in the C10 r5 treatment. 
We then ran an OLS regression analysis of Avg_Eftradei. The independent variables 
include four treatment dummy variables and Avg_rebtmsi. The regression result is 
reported in Table 5.  We find that the coefficient of C10 is significantly different from 
Auto_fb (p=0.04), although C5 is not significantly different from Auto_fb (p=0.12). This 
suggests that a high reporting cost can reduce the number of efficient trades in the market. 
The regression result also reveals that the coefficient of C10r5 is significantly different 
from those of Auto_fb (p=0.01) and C5 (p=0.05), but not significantly different from C10 
(p=0.07). This indicates that under the rebate mechanism, if no rebate is ever offered, the 
number of efficient trades is just the same as when there is no rebate mechanism.  
 On the other hand, the coefficient of Avg_rebtmsi is significantly positive, which 
suggests that the more often a buyer receives a rebate from the seller, the more efficient 
trades the buyer achieves. The magnitude of the coefficient of Avg_rebtmsi also suggests 
that if a buyer always receives a rebate from the matched seller (i.e. Avg_rebtmsi=1), 
then the number of efficient trades can be as many as in the Auto_fb treatment.   
 
Result 9. When the rebate mechanism is available, buyers’ and sellers’ earnings are 
increasing in the number of rebates offered by sellers. 
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Similar to the analysis of the effect of rebate on efficient trades, we examine the 
effect of rebate on the buyer and the seller’s earnings using the same method. We 
calculate the average earnings over 10 rounds for each buyer and seller. We then run an 
OLS regression analysis of buyers’ earnings using the same independent variables as in 
the regression in Table 5. The result is shown in Table 6. We find the coefficients of C10 
and C5 are significant lower than that of Auto_fb (p<0.01 in both cases), but not different 
from one another (p=0.75). This suggests that buyers earn significantly less when 
reporting feedback is costly than when the reputation can be automatically recorded at no 
cost to the buyers.  
 The coefficient of C10r5 is significantly lower than the coefficients of the three 
other treatments (p<0.01 for all the pair-wise tests). This indicates that if buyers are never 
offered a rebate, they will earn less than if there is no rebate mechanism (i.e., C10 
treatment). On the other hand, the coefficient of Avg_rebtmsi is significantly positive, 
suggesting that a buyer who receives rebates more often can also earn more. Indeed, the 
regression results suggest that if a buyer receives rebates every time (i.e., Avg_rebtmsi=1), 
she can earn almost as much as the buyers in the Auto_fb treatment.  If a buyer receives 
rebates more than 80% of the time (i.e., Avg_rebtmsi=0.8), she can earn more than the 
buyers in the C5 or C10 treatments.  Again, this suggests that the rebate not only 
compensates a buyer’s cost but facilitates buyers to make efficient trades.  
 Using the same regression analysis, we next discuss the effect of reporting cost 
and the rebate mechanism on the sellers’ earnings. The regression result is reported in 
Table 6.  We find that reporting cost does not significantly affect sellers’ earnings. In 
particular, the coefficient of neither C5 nor C10 is significantly different from Auto_fb 
(p=0.13 and 0.08, respectively). However, the coefficient of C10r5 is significantly 
36 
 
different from C10, C5 and Auto_fb (p=0.056, 0.04 and 0.00 respectively). This suggests 
that when the rebate mechanism is available, not providing the rebate makes the seller 
earn even less than if the rebate mechanism is not introduced.   
On the other hand, the regression result also suggests that providing a rebate 
positively affects sellers’ earnings (coefficient of Avg_rebtmsi is significantly positive).  
The positive coefficient of Avg_rebtmsi indicates that if the seller offers rebates 80% of 
the time, she can earn more than she does in the corresponding no-rebate environment 
(i.e., the C10 treatment). To earn as much as the sellers in the C5 treatment, the seller 
needs to provide rebates about 90% of the time. If the seller provides  rebate every time, 
her earnings will be just slightly lower than in the Auto_fb tareatment.  
 
VI. Discussion 
In this paper, we use theoretical and empirical methods to study an innovative rebate-for-
feedback mechanism in reputation systems. Our experimental data support our hypothesis 
about the effectiveness of the rebate mechanism. In particular, the rebate offer from the 
seller provides buyers a credible signal as to the seller’s quality. Sellers who offer more 
rebates are more likely to cooperate. Importantly, the rebate mechanism can improve 
market efficiency in that the more often rebates are offered, the more efficient trades 
occur. The market designer may thus consider incorporating the rebate option mechanism 
into the real market when there is an asymmetric information problem.  
We also find that a buyer’s propensity to report is more sensitive to reporting cost 
when a seller cooperates than when a seller defects. Consistent with this result, a rebate 
offer increases a buyer’s propensity to leave feedback when the seller cooperates, but has 
no effect when the seller defects. In other words, the feedback we observe from our 
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experiment is negatively biased. This is in contrast to the empirical observations from 
eBay’s website, where 99% of feedback was positive in the eBay-like bilateral feedback 
system (See Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002, Cabral and Hortacsu, forthcoming). 
16
 
One explanation is that the bi-lateral feedback system, in contrast to the unilateral 
feedback reporting system studied in this paper, creates asymmetric costs for reporting 
(the cost for reporting negative feedback is higher than that for reporting positive 
feedback). As we mentioned above, one of the reasons for these asymmetric costs is the 
fear of retaliation. When the feedback system is bi-lateral, a strategic seller has the 
opportunity to leave negative feedback for a buyer who leaves him negative feedback.
17
 
In our experiment, only buyers can leave feedback to sellers, not the other way around.   
Another possible explanation is that negative feedback reporting, as a way to 
punish the counterpart, is determined by whether the reporter thinks the counterpart has a 
negative intention. In our experiment, the lower payoff is caused only by the seller’s 
dishonesty. Thus, it is always clear to buyers whether the seller intentionally cheated.  
However, in the naturally occurring online trading market, the final trading outcomes 
always bear some degree of uncertainty.  For example, the seller might have shipped the 
product on time, but the package was delayed by the post office.  Xiao and Kunreuther 
(2009) find that people tend not to punish when they are not sure whether there were bad 
intentions behind a bad outcome.  It follows that buyers might tend not to leave negative 
feedback if they are uncertain about whether a seller harmed them intentionally.   
                                                 
16 This data was collected prior to the eBay’s policy to ban sellers from leaving negative feedback to buyers 
in May 2008.  
17 Li (forthcoming) and Klein et al. (2005) suggest that fear of retaliation is a concern buyers have about 
leaving negative feedback.  
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In this paper, we take a first step to test the effectiveness of the rebate mechanism 
in a listing price market. The rebate mechanism takes the form of monetary compensation. 
In the naturally occurring online market, the forms of rebates may depend on the real 
reporting cost or concerns for users. This provides direction for further research on this 
topic. We are also conducting further studies to examine the rebate mechanism in other 
types of markets, such as an auction market where a rebate mechanism may benefit 
sellers by raising the price of the products.  
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Figure A. Seller-Buyer game (Auto_fb treatment) 
 
Note: the first number is the buyer’s payoff and the second number is the seller’s payoff. 
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Figure B. C10 treatment  
 
Note: the first number is the buyer’s payoff and the second number is the seller’s payoff. 
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Figure C. C5 treatment  
 
Note: the first number is the buyer’s payoff and the second number is the seller’s payoff. 
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Figure D. C10r5 treatment 
 
Note: the first number is the buyer’s payoff and the second number is the seller’s payoff. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of sellers’ rebate frequency in the C10r5 treatment 
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Figure 2.  Proportion of sellers who offered rebates over 10 rounds 
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Figure 3. Proportion of efficient trades in each treatment 
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Table 1   Descriptive data of the decisions 
 
 
Buyer   Seller 
Treatment Purchasing rate Reporting rate* Shipping rate* 
Auto_fb 79.17  88.42 
C5 69.57 31.88 83.75 
C10 67.50 10.49 81.48 
C10r5_reb 83.91 27.85 85.84 
C10r5_noreb 36.14 33.33 56.67 
* The rate is calculated based on the cases where buyers choose to buy. 
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Table 2. Buyers’ Feedback Reporting Decisions: Random Effect Logit Regression Model 
 
 
Reporti,t (=1 if report in round t; =0 if not report) 
 (1) 
(include C5 and 
C10 treatments) 
(2) 
(include C5 and 
C10 treatments) 
(3) 
(include C5, C10 and 
C10r5 treatments) 
 Coef. 
(s.e.) 
Coef. 
(s.e.) 
Coef. 
(s.e.) 
Round(t) -0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.44 
(0.14) 
-0.30 
(0.08) 
Final round 
(=1 if t=10) 
-0.56 
(0.90) 
-3.69 
(1.45) 
-2.72 
(0.88) 
C10 -2.45 
(0.67) 
  
C5 -0.55 
(0.60) 
  
C10ship  -5.17 
(1.52) 
-4.76 
(1.17) 
C10noship  2.82 
(1.45) 
1.84 
(1.05) 
C5ship  -0.09 
(1.06) 
-0.49 
(0.83) 
C5noship  4.85 
(1.59) 
3.51 
(1.09) 
C10r5_rebship   -0.54 
(0.66) 
C10r5_norebship   -3.82 
(1.23) 
C10r5_rebnoship   2.11 
(0.98) 
C10r5_norebnoship   1.65 
(1.09) 
Wald chi2(-)   30.93 27.52 62.02 
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Table 3. Buyers’ Purchasing Decisions: Random Effect Logit Regression Model 
 
 
Buyi,t (=1 if purchased in round t; =0 if not ) 
  
Include Auto_fb, C5 & C10 treatments 
      (1)                                    (2) 
  
Include all the four treatments 
        (3) 
 Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) 
Round (t) -0.04 (0.05) 0.07 (0.12) -0.03 (0.09) 
Final round  
(=1, if t=10) 
-1.52 (0.42) -2.74 (0.79) -2.18 (0.56) 
C10 1.77 (0.61) 2.37 (1.11) 2.77 (0.89) 
C5 1.79 (0.60) 2.68 (1.14) 2.76 (0.89) 
Auto_fb 2.37 (0.59) 0.92 (1.18) 1.08 (0.90) 
 Postive fbi,t
t−2
t=1
 
 
0.02 (0.15) 0.12(0.13) 
 Negative fbi,t
t−2
t=1
 
 
-2.48 (0.51) -1.81(0.35) 
Positive fbi,t−1  
1.77 (0.79) 1.56 (0.56) 
Negative fbi,t−1  
-2.95 (0.88) -2.75 (0.65) 
Shipi,t−1  
1.61 (0.57) 1.31 (0.43) 
C10r5_norebi,t   
 -1.79 (0.87) 
C10r5_rebi,t    2.51 (0.80) 
Wald chi2(-)   45.75 50.84 89.56 
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Table 4. Sellers’ Shipping Decisions: Regression Models 
 
                                   Shipi,t (=1 if shipped the product in round t; 
                                               =0 if not ) 
   
Random effect Logit regression  
Include C10, C5 and Auto_fb treatments 
 
 Coef. (s.e.) 
Round (t) -0.24 (0.08) 
Final round (t=10) -3.84 (0.83) 
C10 4.34 (0.92) 
C5 5.02 (1.02) 
Auto_fb 4.86 (0.93) 
Wald chi2(-)   47.43 
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Table 5. Average proportion of efficient trades: OLS Regression Models 
 
                                    Avg_Eftradei 
  Include four  treatments 
 Coef. (s.e.) 
C10 0.55 (0.05) 
C5 0.58 (0.05) 
Auto_fb 0.70 (0.05) 
C10r5 0.13 (0.22) 
Avg_rebtmsi 0.61(0.28) 
 
 R-squared 
 
0.8585 
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Table 6. Average earnings: OLS Regression Models 
 
  
               Avg_Earningi 
    
Buyer 
 
Seller 
  Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) 
C10 
 
39.42 (0.86) 46.38 (0.57) 
C5 
 
39.80 (0.88) 46.57 (0.58) 
Auto_fb 
 
43.21 (0.86) 47.79 (0.57) 
C10r5 
 
29.26 (3.63) 43.47 (1.39) 
Avg_rebtmsi 
 
13.67 (4.69) 3.73 (1.72) 
 R-squared 
 
0.9898 0.9966  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
Appendix A: 
Proof of footnote 5: 
For each history th of feedback history, buyers use Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs 
about sellers’ types when there are complete histories about the sellers,  
𝜇𝑡 𝜃𝐺 𝑕𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡𝐺𝑅 +𝑡𝐵𝑅 =
𝜇0
𝑖 𝛼𝑡𝐺𝑅  1−𝛼 𝑡𝐵𝑅
𝜇0
𝑖 𝛼𝑡𝐺𝑅  1−𝛼 𝑡𝐵𝑅 + 1−𝜇0
𝑖  𝛽 𝑡𝐺𝑅  1−𝛽 𝑡𝐵𝑅
. 
We can rewrite this equation as the following: 
𝜇𝑡 𝜃𝐺 𝑕𝑡 =
1
1+
1−𝜇 0
𝑖
𝜇 0
𝑖   
𝛽
𝛼
 
𝑡𝐺𝑅
𝑡
 
1−𝛽
1−𝛼
 
𝑡𝐵𝑅
𝑡
 
. 
If the seller is of type 𝜃𝐺 , then the Weak Low of Large Numbers (WLLNs) implies that  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏  
𝑡 𝐺𝑅
𝑡
≈ 𝛼 ≈ 1. 
When t is large, where 𝑡 𝐺𝑅   is a random variable (rv) that records the number of good 
reports up to and including period t. If 
𝑡 𝐺𝑅
𝑡
≈ 𝛼, then  
 
𝛽
𝛼
 
𝑡𝐺𝑅
𝑡
 
1−𝛽
1−𝛼
 
𝑡𝐵𝑅
𝑡
≈  
𝛽
𝛼
 
𝛼
 
1−𝛽
1−𝛼
 
1−𝛼
.  
Therefore 
ln   
𝛽
𝛼
 
𝛼
 
1 − 𝛽
1 − 𝛼
 
1−𝛼
 = 𝛼 ln  
𝛽
𝛼
 +  1 − 𝛼  
1 − 𝛽
1 − 𝛼
 < ln 𝛽 + 1 − 𝛽 = 0, 
and it follows that    
𝛽
𝛼
 
𝛼
 
1−𝛽
1−𝛼
 
1−𝛼
< 1..  
Consequently, for large t, we conclude that  
1
1+
1−𝜇 0
𝑖
𝜇 0
𝑖 [ 
𝛽
𝛼
 
𝑡𝐺𝑅
𝑡
 
1−𝛽
1−𝛼
 
𝑡𝐵𝑅
𝑡
]
≈
1
1+
1−𝜇 0
𝑖
𝜇 0
𝑖 [ 
𝛽
𝛼
 
𝛼
 
1−𝛽
1−𝛼
 
1−𝛼
]
≈
1
1+0
= 1 . 
with high probability. A similar argument established that 𝜇𝑡 𝜃𝐵 𝑕𝑡 ≈ 0 with high 
probability when the seller is of type 𝜃𝐵  and t is large. ∎ 
 
 
Appendix B:  
Proof of Proposition 1: 
First, let's examine the separating equilibrium where good sellers choose rebates (RS), 
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and bad sellers choose no rebates (NRS). If it is an equilibrium, then buyers can identify 
the seller's type by observing whether the seller chooses the rebate option. If the seller 
chooses it, then she is a good seller, and the good seller's payoff is  𝛼 − 𝑟 . If a seller does 
not choose the rebate option, then she is considered as a bad seller; the buyer's 
willingness to pay is  𝛽 , and the seller's payoff is  𝛽.  If the rebate is larger than the price 
difference between good and bad sellers, i.e.,  𝑟 > 𝛼 − 𝛽  then both good and bad sellers 
choose not to rebate (NRS). If the rebate is less than the price difference between good 
and bad sellers, i.e.,  𝑟 ≤ 𝛼 − 𝛽 , we need to check whether any sellers want to deviate 
from the separating equilibrium. A bad seller would get the higher payoff  𝛼 − 𝑟  instead 
of  𝛽  if she pretends to be a good seller by choosing the rebate option. Thus, the 
separating equilibrium does not exist.  
 
Nor does there exist another separating equilibrium, where good sellers choose not to 
rebate and bad sellers choose to rebate. The payoff to the good seller is  𝛼 , the payoff to 
the bad seller is 𝛽 − 𝑟, and  𝛼 > 𝛽 , so that the bad seller can have a higher payoff if he 
presents himself as a good seller by choosing a rebate. The bad sellers have incentives to 
deviate from this separating equilibrium. Thus, the separating equilibrium does not exist, 
either.  
 
Since the separating equilibrium does not exist, we next examine the pool equilibrium.  
First, we examine the pooling equilibrium where both types of sellers choose to provide 
rebates, RS. The rebate r is chosen in a form that can make good and bad reporting being 
systematically revealed.
18
  To simplify the analysis, we assume that r is greater than the 
net reporting cost (i.e., C B), so it will make all reports being revealed.
19
  In this case, 
buyers cannot know a seller’s type just by observing the seller's choice about providing 
rebates. However, since both types of sellers provide rebates, all buyers will provide 
reports. A future buyer can, by using the information about a seller's previous history, 
update her beliefs on the seller's type. If buyer i does not report, her expected utility at 
period t + 1 is 
                                                 
18 The form of rebate depends on what causes no reports or no systematic reports. See Li (2010) for more 
discussion on this.  
19 If r is not greater for all buyers’ net reporting cost, some buyers will report. As long as good and bad 
reports are systematically revealed, future buyers will still be able to update their beliefs in the right 
direction, and at a slower rate than in the case where all buyers report. The general results still hold.  
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𝐸𝑈𝑏 ,𝑡+1
𝑖 = 𝜇t
𝑖𝛼 +  1 − 𝜇𝑡
𝑖 𝛽 − 𝑃 ,      (1)  
 
while if she chooses to report, her expected utility is  
 𝐸𝑈𝑏 ,𝑡+1
𝑖 = 𝜇𝑡
𝑖𝛼 +  1 − 𝜇𝑡
𝑖 𝛽 − 𝑃 − 𝐶 + 𝐵 + 𝑟.      (2)  
 
In this case, r is greater than the net reporting benefit, so a buyer has higher expected 
payoff if she chooses to report.  
 
The expected payoff for the seller at period t+1 is   
𝐸𝑈𝑠,𝑡+1
𝑖  𝑅𝑠; 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑕𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑅 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑅 = 𝑃𝑟  𝜇𝑡
𝑖 ≥
𝑃−𝛽
𝛼−𝛽
  𝑃 − 𝑟 = 𝑓 𝜇𝑡
𝑖 𝑃 − 𝑟. (3) 
As the number of time periods t becomes infinite, according to the Weak Law of Large 
Numbers, for the good seller equals 1 with very high probability, and the buyer's 
willingness to pay converges to 𝛼; 𝜇  for the bad seller equals 0 with very high 
probability, and the buyer's willingness to pay converges to  𝛽 . If the expected payoff 
from providing rebates is higher than the expected payoff from not providing rebates in 
the long run, i.e., 𝛼 − 𝑟 ≥ 𝑓(𝜇0)𝑃, then the good seller will choose to provide the rebate 
if he is patient. If the expected payoff from providing the rebate is higher than the 
expected payoff from not providing at the beginning, i.e.,   𝑓 𝜇0 𝑃 − 𝑟 > 𝛽 ,  then the 
bad seller wants to mimic good seller and choose the rebate until his payoff is less than 
one identified with a bad seller, i.e., 𝑓 𝜇𝑡 𝑃 − r < 𝛽 . So as long as 𝑟 ≤ 𝛼 − 𝑓 𝜇0 𝑃 and 
𝑟 < 𝑓 𝜇0 𝑃 − 𝛽 , the patient good sellers will choose to give the rebate, and the patient 
bad sellers will also give the rebate until their payoff 𝑓 𝜇𝑡 𝑃 − r is less than  𝛽 ,and 
choose no rebate otherwise. If  𝑟 > 𝛼 − 𝑓 𝜇0 𝑃 , both types of sellers will choose no 
rebate, NRS. 
 
Another pooling equilibrium is that both types of sellers choose not to rebate, (NRS), 
supported by the off-equilibrium path belief that anyone who chooses to rebate, RS, must 
be a bad seller. In this case, the seller's expected payoff is  𝑓 𝜇0 𝑃  for every period. 
If  𝑟 ≤ 𝛼 − 𝑓 𝜇0 𝑃 , this equilibrium does not exist if we use the intuition criteria. 
Since the good sellers want to separate from the bad sellers, good sellers have an 
incentive to give rebates, thus making the buyers report. So the off-equilibrium belief, 
where anyone who chooses rebate is bad, is not feasible. If 𝑟 > 𝛼 − 𝑓 𝜇0 𝑃, then the 
pooling equilibrium in which both types of sellers choose no rebate, NRS, exists.  
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Appendix C: 
Proof of proposition 2: 
 
If T=2, the seller's strategy can be (e(0), e(0)) or (e(1), e(0)), where the first 
element represents the action in period t=1, and the second represents the action in period 
t=2. To examine which strategy is right for the seller, we need to calculate the payoffs. 
 
In a complete information market, if the bad seller chooses (e(0), e(0)), buyer i will buy 
in period 1 if 𝜇0
𝑖 ≥ (𝑃 − 𝛽)/(𝛼 − 𝛽)  but not in period 2 (since the seller does not make 
effort in period 1). So, the seller's total expected payoff over the two periods is 𝐸𝑈𝑠 =
𝐸 𝑓 𝜇0
𝑖  ∙ 𝑃 = 𝑃 ∙ 𝐸(𝑓(𝜇0
𝑖 )). 
 If he chooses (e(1), e(0)), the buyer will buy in period 1 and 2. So the seller's 
total expected payoff is:  
𝐸𝑈𝑠 = 𝐸 Pr 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 1 𝑃 − 𝑒 1 + 𝛿 Pr 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 2 𝑃 = 𝐸[𝑓 𝜇0
𝑖 +  1 − 𝜇0
𝑖  𝑒 1 𝑃 − 𝑒 1 +
𝛿𝑓(
𝜇0
𝑖
𝜇0
𝑖 + 1−𝜇0
𝑖  𝑒 1
)𝑃],  
where  𝛿  is a discount factor to transform the future payoff to the present value. If 𝑒 1 = 1, 
then  𝐸𝑈𝑠 = 𝐸 𝑃 − 𝑒 1 + 𝛿𝑓 𝜇0
𝑖  𝑃 = 𝑃 − 𝑒 1 + 𝛿𝑓(𝜇0)𝑃 . 
If 𝑃 − 𝑒 1 + 𝛿𝑓 𝜇0 𝑃 ≥ 𝑓(𝜇0)𝑃, i.e., 𝑒 1 ≤ [1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑓(𝜇0)]𝑃  then the bad 
seller's best strategy is to make an effort in the first period but not in the second period, 
(e(1), e(0)). 
 
For a T-period game, the expected payoffs to bad type sellers in each period are 
the following:  
At t=1, 𝑉1 = 𝐸[Pr 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 1 𝑃 + 𝛿𝐼 𝑒1 𝑉2 − 𝑒1(1)] 
If𝑒1 = 1, 𝐼 𝑒1 = 1, and 𝑉1 = 1 + 𝛿𝑉2 − 𝑒 1 . 
If 𝑒1 = 0, 𝐼 𝑒1 = 0, and 𝑉1 = 𝐸[Pr 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 1𝑃] = 𝐸 𝑓 𝜇0
𝑖 +  1 − 𝜇0
𝑖  𝑒 1 𝑃 =
𝐸 𝑓 𝜇0
𝑖  𝑃 = 𝑓(𝜇0)𝑃. 
 
At t=2, 𝑉2 = 𝐸[𝑃𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 2 𝑃 + 𝛿𝐼 𝑒2 𝑉3 − 𝑒2(1)]  
If 𝑒2 = 1, 𝐼 𝑒2 = 1, and 𝑉2 = 𝑃 + 𝛿𝑉3 − 𝑒(1).  
If 𝑒2 = 0, 𝐼 𝑒2 = 0, and 𝑉2 = 𝐸 𝑃𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 2𝑃 = 𝐸 𝑓 𝜇1
𝑖 +  1 − 𝜇1
𝑖  𝑒 2 𝑃 =
𝐸 𝑓 𝜇1
𝑖  𝑃 = 𝐸 𝑓 𝜇0
𝑖  𝑃 = 𝑓(𝜇0)𝑃.  
……… 
 
At t=T-1, 𝑉𝑇−1 = 𝐸[Pr 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑇−1 𝑃 + 𝛿𝐼 𝑒𝑇−1 𝑉𝑇 − 𝑒𝑇−1(1)] 
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If 𝑒𝑇−1 = 1, 𝐼 𝑒𝑇−1 = 1, and 𝑉𝑇−1 = 𝑃 + 𝛿𝑉𝑇 − 𝑒(1). 
If 𝑒𝑇−1 = 0, 𝐼 𝑒𝑇−1 = 0, and 𝑉𝑇−1 = 𝐸 Pr 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑇−1 𝑃 = 𝑓(𝜇0)𝑃. 
 
At t=T, 𝑉𝑇 = 𝐸 Pr 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑇 𝑃 = 𝑓(𝜇0)𝑃. 
 
In order to induce the bad sellers to choose  𝑒𝑡 = 1  for every period prior to T, the 
condition  𝑒 1 ≤ [1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑓(𝜇0)]𝑃  must be satisfied. As long as it holds, bad 
sellers will make a genuine effort for t=0 to t=T-1, but will cease to do so in the last 
period.  
 
Appendix D:  
Proof of Proposition 3: 
Proof.  If the reporting cost is more than the maximum reporting benefit, then no buyer 
will be inclined to report. In this case, the expected buyer's willingness to pay is 𝑃𝑖 =
𝑓(𝜇0)𝑃. The good sellers will be worse off than in the case where there is no reporting 
cost, and the bad sellers will not make an effort in any period. If we use the incentive 
mechanism proposed in the pure adverse selection model, both types of sellers will 
choose to give a rebate if the rebate is less than the price difference for good transactions 
and bad transactions, i.e., 𝑟 < 𝐸 Pr 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑇−1 𝑃 + 𝛿𝐼 𝑒𝑇−1 𝑉𝑇 − 𝑒𝑇−1 1  . In 
equilibrium Pr 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑇−1 = 1, 𝐼 𝑒𝑇−1 = 1, 𝑉𝑇 = 𝑓(𝜇0)𝑃, and 𝑒𝑇−1(1)= 𝑒(1), the above 
condition is simplified to 𝑟 <  1 −  1 − 𝛿 𝑓 𝜇0  𝑃 − 𝑒 1 . Also, bad sellers will put 
forth effort as long as their payoffs are more than  𝑓(𝜇0)𝑃 for each period. ∎ 
 
 
 
